As we have already seen in previous chapters, in Miracle and Machine: Jacques Derrida and the Two Sources of Religion, Science, and the Media, Michael Naas ofers a close reading of Jacques Derrida's 1996 essay "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of Religion at the Limits of Reason Alone." Naas shows how these two sources of religion, the miraculous and the machinic, constitute what Derrida calls "religion" as faith and as the sacred. Furthermore, Naas traces these themes of miracle and machine across Derrida's corpus and shows how these questions related to religion animate Derrida's philosophy from the beginning to the end of his life. In addition, Naas intersperses his readings of Derrida on religion with some extraordinary connections to and reflections on Don Delillo's novel, Underworld.
I want to endorse Naas's reading of Derrida on religion, and his insistence on the two sources of Derrida's thinking about religion, and the role of religion in the con temporary world. In some ways Derrida is a "religious" thinker, but his religiosity is not simply equivalent to any specific religion. Naas explains that Derrida uses words like "faith," "God," and "messianicity" "in ways that court misunderstanding," but they are related to how Naas articulates the term "miracle" in his book. According to Naas, "Derrida says that we are called upon to believe every testimonyevery claim to truth, every claim that one is telling the truth about what one knows, believes, or sees-as an 'extraordinary story' or a miracle." 1 The prob lem with the miracle, however, is that because of repetition it is Po liti cal Theology Without Sovereignty 3 always caught up in a kind of machine. "Derrida says that the machine is simply another way of speaking about calculation and repetition," argues Nass, "but about a calculation and repetition in relationship always to the incalculable and the unforeseeable." 2 This machinic repetition of the miracle both ruins the singularly miraculous quality of the miracle and also at the same time paradoxically makes it pos si ble in the first place.
As soon as you have life, which is a miraculous event, you also have a kind of mechanics or what Arthur Bradley calls "originary technicity." 3 Religion, like life, conjoins the two ele ments of a singular re spect for human existence with a kind of sacrificial repetition of this life that constitutes a mechanics, or a sort of death-in-life. This mechanical repetition "reproduces, with the regularity of a technique, the instance of the nonliving or, if you prefer, of the dead in the living." 4 As Steven Shakespeare explains,
The singular event requires an archive, if it is to survive and be read. This archive always has something "machinelike" about it: a capacity for iteration that exceeds or, rather, precedes the formation of conscious intentionality. This is the cut, the wounding of the pres ent that ensures the possibility of survival. A kind of thinking of the cut, of the absolute-and of God-because this machinelike structure that presupposes itself, that causes itself, is strangely akin to God. Indeed Derrida understands the question of the technical as question of the theological. 5 Religion in its two sources of the sacred and belief incorporates both the singular re spect of life and the regularity of a non-living technique, such that the mechanical and theological converge, as Shakespeare points out. In "Faith and Knowledge," the theological machine is a "machine for making gods," as Derrida quotes Bergson from The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. 6 And these gods perpetrate miraculous acts, acts of sovereign exceptionality.
In amplifying Derrida's work by re-turning to and opening up this profoundly impor tant text on religion, Naas helps us assess not only Derrida's philosophy but how it is that we can think and think about religion today. In his conclusion, Naas borrows an image in the form of a specific billboard sign from Underworld and claims that in their inextricable intersection, faith and knowledge, or miracle and machine, compose a sign that reads: "Space Available." Naas reads this sign as "an affirmation that, for the moment, there is still time, and in the words of the sign itself, which can be read as the translation of either a messianicity without messianism or khôra, still space available." 7 In this chapter, I focus more explic itly on a theme that Naas raises over the course of a few pages but does not fully elaborate, which is that of sovereignty. Derrida's religious writings are always connected to his po litical reflections, specifically the attempt to elaborate a "democracy to come" that would not be constituted in terms of sovereignty. According to Naas, the oneness or indivisibility of the sovereign is the legacy of par tic u lar religion-Chris tian ity-and a par tic u lar po liti cal history-Western Eu ropean, that needs to be contested and deconstructed. As Naas says, throughout the 1980s and 1990s and right up to his death, Derrida relentlessly pursued a kind of radical or originary secularism or secularity that constantly questions and criticizes the imposition of any par tic u lar religion or religious doctrine upon po liti cal concepts. Motivated in part by the analyses of Carl Schmitt, Derrida takes up the proj ect of demonstrating the ontotheological origins of what at first appear to be modern secular concepts such as popu lar sovereignty, democracy, and religious tolerance. 8
On this reading, a Christian po liti cal theology, of which we caught a glimpse in the previous chapter in Derrida's interpretation of Merchant of Venice, is entangled with sovereignty. Derrida appreciates the incisiveness of Schmitt's analy sis of po liti cal theology in Po liti cal Theology, but he also criticizes and opposes Schmitt's conception of politics, most explic itly in The Politics of Friendship. My argument is that Derrida is working to deconstruct or dismantle the sovereignty that undergirds the po liti cal theology of Carl Schmitt. At the same time, Derrida is attentive to the inextricability of something like a theology in every politics, and the impossibility of completely separating questions of religion from questions of politics. Furthermore, I suggest that this thematic of the critique or deconstruction of sovereignty animates Derrida's text on "Faith and Knowledge," even if it is less explic itly foregrounded in the essay.
Sovereignty is what interlaces the theological and the po liti cal for Schmitt, which is why Derrida takes his distance from any explicit form of po liti cal theology. 9 The question of the deconstruction of sovereignty lies in what happens to the theological and the po liti cal if this link to sovereignty is undone. The main prob lem with sovereignty lies in its insistence on the "One," in Schmitt's case the one who decides on the exception. This oneness draws the po liti cal and the theological together into an antidemocratic machine of domination. For Derrida, there is no simple "one" who decides.
In Two: The Machine of Po liti cal Theology and the Place of Thought, Roberto Esposito lays out his understanding of the machine of po liti cal theology that encompasses the entire history of the West. According to Esposito, it is the specific relation of the two-the theological and the political-that constitutes a strange sort of unity. This unity or oneness is constituted by "a pro cess of exclusionary assimilation." The Two are included in the One is a way such that "the imposition of one . . . seeks to eliminate the other." 10 Western humanity is caught within the workings of this machine. This machine of po liti cal theology is so efective and so inescapable because it comes to define human subjectivity, what it means to be a person. The dispositive of the person is constituted by the bond between subjectivity and subjugation, and this bond is internalized in the creation of human persons. 11 Esposito devotes his book to analyzing the history of the formation and development of this machine from ancient Rome and early Chris tian ity up through modernity, and to finding ways to undo or render inoperable this machine.
The po liti cal theological machine functions by means of "an exclusionary se lection of what it absorbs." 12 The Two become One by an assimilative exclusion of the other, which is never complete. This incompletion then drives the machine onward. In his book, despite its impressive scope, Esposito fails to consider Derrida's work in the context of his analy sis of po liti cal theology, but I think that Derrida's thought is highly relevant to Esposito's analy sis. Derrida attends to the deconstruction of the One into its constitutive Twoness, and opening up alternative ways of understanding and appropriating the history of Western Christian po liti cal theology.
In this chapter, I set up a context for Derrida's later work that stretches from The Politics of Friendship and includes Specters of Marx (and really begins with his 1989 essay "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority") to his later book Rogues and his two-volume lecture course on The Beast and the Sovereign. These works all can be seen to pivot around the idea of the deconstruction of sovereignty and the possibility of undoing this "theologico-political" link. Here I briefly reflect on Schmitt's famous text, Po liti cal Theology, whose subtitle is "Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty," along with his The Concept of the Po liti cal, and then consider some relevant passages from Derrida's texts mentioned earlier. Derrida's essay "Faith and Knowledge," along with Naas's reading of it, remains in the background.
I am claiming that the po liti cal emphasis of Derrida's later thought is consistent with the focus on religion in many of his works, because both of these make up what Esposito calls the machine of po liti cal theology. Derrida deconstructs sovereignty as a way to undermine the working of the machine, the paradoxical exclusionary inclusion of the Two in the One. Derrida does not explic itly treat the theme of po liti cal theology, but all of his works are related in some re spect to this theme. This focus on the machine of po liti cal theology also opens up deconstruction from any literal association with writing. Religion and politics always interact and intersect, in power ful and problematic ways, and they do so not only in writing but also in broader transformative ways.
Derrida's philosophy has always been directed against the unity of the One. In his earlier work, his focus on dissemination is more literally a form of writing, a working against the presumed unity of speech. Dissemination involves a kind of double writing, as we can see in his essays "Dissemination" and "The Double Session" (Derrida's interpretation of Mallarmé), both of which are included in the book Dissemination. 13 Writing as dissemination exposes it to its otherness in a way that precludes gathering into a unity, and it punctures sovereign authority. But in his later works, Derrida's analyses are no longer configured specifically or generally in terms of writing.
In his later writings, Derrida draws closer to technics, or the machinic, and its connection to belief as a kind of promise that implies ethical responsibility as its condition of possibility and impossibility, as the under lying condition and context for thinking about the workings of religion and politics. In "Faith and Knowledge," for example, the context for reflecting on the two sources of religion is a more biopo liti cal conception of autoimmunity. The nature and role of religion in the con temporary world, which is one of "globalatinization," implies that we cannot simply dismiss or dispense with religion as a phenomenon. Religion constitutes a kind of auto-immune phenomenon that "is silently at work within every community, constituting it as such in its iterability, its heritage, its spectral tradition." 14 Religion is something intrinsic to community that threatens community with "a princi ple of self-destruction" in the form of violent fundamentalism. At the same time, this "self-contesting attestation keeps the auto-immune community alive, which is to say, open to something other and more than itself." 15 Here, religion is a form of auto-immunity that both protects and threatens the social body. Auto-immunity as a paradigm to think about religion invokes the machine, what constitutes the machinic, and what exceeds the machine as what makes it pos si ble, what makes life worth living in its excess, its dignity, and its faith. Community and autoimmunity are not figures of writing; they constitute an opening to another form of conceptuality that Malabou calls plasticity. We could say that in Derrida, after writing recedes as a motor scheme, what comes to replace it can be viewed through the lens of technics and responsibility. I engage more with this theme in Chapter 7 by way of a more direct encounter with Malabou's philosophy.
My specific argument in this chapter is that, in his later work, Derrida is trying to sketch out a kind of po liti cal theology without sovereignty that would counter the po liti cal theology of Carl Schmitt, which is essentially tied to a form of sovereignty. Schmitt defines sovereignty in politicaltheological terms for Derrida, but Derrida wants to think about a radical politics of democracy that would not be defined as sovereign in Schmittian terms. Derrida accepts Schmitt's assertion that the po liti cal and the theological are both historically and structurally interrelated, but he imagines a future for po liti cal theory that is not tied to sovereignty. Because he associates Schmitt's conservative philosophy with the phrase "po liti cal theology," Derrida does not himself use this term. However, one way to read Derrida's later work is to see him as elaborating a po liti cal theology without sovereignty.
According to Geofrey Bennington, a significant theme of Derrida's later work is "his call for an unconditionality without sovereignty." Sovereignty involves the efort to immunize the subject or sovereign from the risk of death that comes with the uncontainable uncertainty of an event. But for Derrida this unconditionality that is quasi-religious "involves exposure to the absolutely unexpected event as a condition of anything like 'life.' " 16 Unconditionality without sovereignty draws attention to the ways in which both politics and religion attempt to immunize themselves in dangerous and problematic ways. Derrida points out where and how both are exposed to the possibility of an event, and how this exposure is what makes them expressions of a living community even as it exposes them to death, the death of a machinic repetition. Po liti cal theology is a machine that names the crossing of religion with politics in our "globalatinized" world, even as it exposes the working of that machine to another conditionality that Derrida calls unconditional.
In his groundbreaking book Po liti cal Theology, published in 1922, Schmitt famously claims that "all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts," and this is not only due to their "historical development," but also has to do with their "systematic structure." 17 This sentence opens the third chapter of the four chapters on the concept of sovereignty, and here Schmitt directly expresses the famous secularization hypothesis. In his analy sis, Schmitt argues for a sociology of concepts, one that takes into account the genuine significance of ideas without simply arguing for or against one side or the other (secular vs. theological). He claims that during the modern period of Eu ro pean intellectual history, the battle against God represents an attack on transcendence for the sake of immanence, and this pro cess results in modern atheism. In their attack on liberal atheism, conservative counter-revolutionary religious thinkers such as Donoso Cortés reveal what is importantly at stake in this transformation. It's not simply theism vs. atheism; the problem for Schmitt is that liberal democracy represents an "onslaught against the po liti cal." 18 The revolt against God ends up destroying not only religion but politics as well. Why? Because our understanding of God is tied to a modern conception of sovereignty, and the basis of sovereignty is its personalistic decision-making capacity. The first sentence of Po liti cal Theology reads: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." 19 A decision has to be a sovereign decision to be a true po liti cal decision. Schmitt criticizes the degeneration of modern law and economics to the point where it attempts to eradicate the need for any decision. This elimination of the decision is both impossible and undesirable. At the end of the book, he argues that Whereas, on the one hand, the po liti cal vanishes into the economic or technical-organizational, on the other hand the po liti cal dissolves into the everlasting discussion of cultural and philosophical-historical commonplaces, which, by aesthetic characterization, identify and accept an epoch as classical, romantic, or baroque. The core of the po liti cal idea, the exacting moral decision, is evaded in both. 20 Sovereignty is tied to the possibility of a po liti cal decision, which is an exacting moral decision. In overthrowing the sovereignty of God, humans are attempting to get rid of sovereignty altogether. But this efort eliminates all politics, which Schmitt wants to hold onto. Politics requires the sovereign decision in order to be morally exacting, and there is always a residual structure of the theological in every moral-political decision.
In a book written later in the 1920s, The Concept of the Po liti cal, Schmitt further clarifies what he means by the po liti cal, which is the famous distinction between friend and enemy. 21 It is the ability to make such a distinction that renders an action po liti cal or morally exacting in its highest sense. And this ability to make such a clear and absolute distinction is precisely what Derrida contests in The Politics of Friendship. Derrida suggests that an opposition between friend and enemy of the sort that Schmitt sets up necessarily deconstructs. There is an aporia in the event of a po liti cal decision that ruins sovereignty at the same time it upholds it. For Schmitt, politics depends on the decision concerning who is a friend and who is an enemy, and the enemy is then the object of po liti cal hatred and war. But Derrida notes that "the fundamentally Christian politics" of Schmitt, is only pos si ble when thought under a "Christian metaphysics of subjectivity." 22 According to Derrida, the sovereign decision is ruined from within by an aporia of responsibility. He argues that "a theory of the subject" such as Schmitt's "is incapable of accounting for the slightest decision." 23 This is because every active or autonomous decision is also exposed to a passive decision as its necessary condition. "The passive decision," Derrida writes, as the "condition of the event, is always in me, structurally, another event, a rending decision as the decision of the other." 24 Schmitt's po liti cal theology cannot account for this other decision that inhabits and wrecks the sovereign decision that decides on the exception. Derrida says that "the decision is not only always exceptional, it makes an exception of/for me." 25 The sovereign decision makes an exception for me, and I have the power to decide, but this decision "exonerates from no responsibility." Responsibility, which lies at the heart of Derrida's faith, as one of the two sources of religion, means that I am "responsible from myself before the other, I am first of all and also responsible for the other before the other." 26 The temptation is to read this responsibility as a moral exhortation, but for Derrida it is a much deeper and more structural situation that he develops from the philosophy of Levinas, and this responsibility constitutes the self as self. As the Indian philos o pher Saitya Brata Das explains, Derrida "speaks of a messianic exception which for him is the true exception, and which is dif er ent from the exceptionality of the sovereign in re spect to law." 27 The true, messianic exception is the general case of exception that makes us responsible as subjects for an other. This exceptionality both constitutes and ruins responsibility because it makes us responsible, but it also makes us irresponsible, because we can never do justice to the other, not even to ourselves as other.
Derrida wants to avoid or overcome the Christian metaphysics and politics of Schmitt, but he understands that there is an irreducible religious ele ment to all politics and all philosophy, so he adopts the term "messianic," or a messianicity without messianism as he articulates it in Specters of Marx. "The messianic appeal," he writes, "belongs properly to a universal structure, to that irreducible movement of the historical opening to the future, therefore to experience itself and to language." 28 This universal structure of messianicity is contrasted with any determinate messianism as religion. It is a "religion without religion," as Derrida says in The Gift of Death. The human being is marked by this exceptional messianicity and this unavoidable responsibility, divided and shared as she is between a pure animal and an absolute sovereign.
In his two-volume lecture course on The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida tracks these themes of sovereignty and animality through Western literary and philosophical discourse. In Volume I, he claims that he is working against Schmitt's "cunning intensification of the po liti cal" that relies on a conception of evil by which to judge the po liti cal enemy, but he affirms the necessity for "an other politicization" rather than a de-politicization, "and therefore another concept of the po liti cal." 29 This other concept of the po liti cal is based on a deconstruction of sovereignty. For Derrida, sovereignty is not indivisible; it is divisible and divided. And "a divisible sovereignty is no longer a sovereignty, a sovereignty worthy of the name, i.e. pure and unconditional." 30 It's not enough to simply change subjects or exchange sovereigns from God to monarch to people: "the sovereignty of the people or of the nation merely inaugurates a new form of the same fundamental structure." 31 The deconstruction of sovereignty issues not in a liberal democracy, however politicized. Derrida affirms a more radical form of democracy, a democracy to come.
Schmitt takes aim, along with many other conservative and radical critics, at liberal democracy. He ofers a scornful dismissal of liberalism in Po liti cal Theology to the efect that "liberalism . . . existed . . . only in that short period in which it was pos si ble to answer the question 'Christ or Barabbas?' with a proposal to adjourn or to appoint a commission of investigation." 32 In a similar vein, Alain Badiou rails against con temporary parliamentary democracies and their inability to recognize radical evil. 33 Derrida does not want to defend existing liberal or parliamentary democracy, but he does want to save the name of democracy, and to inflect it in more futural terms.
In Rogues, Derrida shows how the question of democracy is still necessarily caught up with the question of God, even if he wants to think both democracy and divinity without sovereignty. Most con temporary reflections on democracy see it as tied to a form of sovereignty. He says that "now, democracy would be precisely this, a force (kratos) a force in the form of a sovereign authority . . . , and thus the power and ipseity of the people (dēmos)." 34 Is it pos si ble to have democracy without sovereignty, and if so, what would that mean?
The prob lem is that any sovereignty necessarily involves the One, the authority of the One who acts and decides, whether the sovereign is God or King or People. Even if demo cratic sovereignty relies on the sovereignty of the people, it retains "the sovereignty of the One . . . above and beyond the dispersion of the plural." 35 A state-form that relies on any form of sovereignty is in some re spects a rogue state, because the force of sovereign authority ultimately comes down to the "reason of the strongest." 36 For Derrida, an affirmation of democracy would have to mean a dispersal of the One, a sending of and away of sovereignty, which means that democracy is never simply pres ent but always also futural, "to come." This futurity at the heart of the pres ent is also a kind of messianicity insofar as it is never fully pres ent, but also gestured toward as in to the arrival of an apparition, or a ghost.
A post-sovereign democracy would have to be plural; it would have to pluralize and thus dislocate or deconstruct sovereignty, especially the sovereignty of the One. Schmitt's po liti cal theology affirms the sovereign act as a way to maintain the integrity and seriousness of politics. But Derrida attempts to think politics beyond or without sovereignty, without the sovereign one that possesses the authority to make a genuine po liti cal decision. This attempt destroys realist power politics, but it remains a vital hope for any person or people who strive for justice. A politics based on justice in the Derridean sense has to affirm democracy, not as an actual state of afairs, but as Derrida explains, "the democracy to come would be like the khôra of the po liti cal." 37 Khôra is the space available for po liti cal negotiation, that resists the closing in on itself of a sovereign One.
Derrida won ders whether his understanding of democracy and his advocating of a "democracy to-come" "might not lead back to or be reducible to some unavowed theologism." 38 Politics cannot be completely dissociated from religion, and there is a religious messianicity that haunts all our politics, even if we can keep politics from degenerating into this or that messianism. He asks, "the democracy to come, will this be a god to come? Or more than one? Will this be the name to come of a god or of democracy? Utopia? Prayer? Pious wish? Oath? Or something else altogether?" 39 Derrida suggests that democracy has some connection to Heidegger's late thinking about God, as expressed in the posthumous interview, "Only a God Can Save Us," even though Heidegger resists such a connection. By reflecting carefully about his own complicated relationship to Heidegger, Derrida concludes his essay by suggesting that his own (Derrida's) understanding of democracy is tied to the idea "of a god without sovereignty," even though "nothing is less sure than his coming, to be sure." 40 Nothing is less sure than a god who could save us, even if that is the only thing that can save us now. And nothing is less sure than a democracy to come, even if that is the only hope for a responsible politics. 41 Just as Derrida won ders whether Heidegger can avoid writing a theology, we are justified in asking whether Derrida, in fact, has a po liti cal theology. To be sure, he does not use that name, and I think that it mainly due to his desire to distance himself from Schmitt's po liti cal theology. But the question remains: Is there only one po liti cal theology, that of Schmitt, or is there more than one? This is the question, and the promise, of Jeffrey W. Robbins's book Radical Democracy and Po liti cal Theology, which seeks to develop a po liti cal theology that would not be Schmittian. Robbins relies on the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to articulate a politi cal theology of the multitude that constitutes a radical form of democracy rather than a unitary sovereign power.
Robbins cites Derrida's criticism of Schmitt in The Politics of Friendship, and claims that this encounter "leaves us with the question of whether a po liti cal theology might provide the necessary supplement to con temporary demo cratic theory and practice without falling prey to the same exclusive logic as Schmitt." 42 I want to suggest that this is partly what Derrida is trying to do, but he avoids the phrase "po liti cal theology" for the same reason that so many theorists do, because of the long shadow cast on Eu ro pean radical thought by Carl Schmitt. According to Antonio Negri, whose philosophy Robbins draws upon heavi ly in his book, there is only "just one po liti cal theology, the one at whose opposite ends stand Bodin and Stalin, with Carl Schmitt occupying a slot somewhere in between." 43 If Negri is right, then Robbins is wrong, and there is no possibility for any po liti cal theology without sovereignty because sovereignty defines po litical theology. 44 Derrida opposes po liti cal theology in name, but he also recognizes how religion cannot be exorcised from politics, from "Force of Law" to his last writings. Instead of po liti cal theology, he works with the quasi-religious category of messianicity, a messianicity without messianism, because it is a "weaker," or less sovereign, power. In a 1994 essay, "Taking a Stand for Algeria," Derrida takes "a stand for the efective dissociation of the po litical and the theological." He states that "our idea of democracy implies a separation between the state and the religious powers, that is, a radical religious neutrality and a faultless tolerance which would not only set the sense of belonging to religions, cults, and thus also cultures and languages, away from the reach of any terror . . . but also protects the practices of faith, and, in this instance, the freedom of discussion and interpretation within each religion." 45 The religious power that the theological represents, when aligned with the po liti cal force of the state, produces terror.
Does po liti cal theology necessarily imply this sovereign power and therefore a rogue state with its concomitant vio lence and terror? Perhaps. But what if the theological itself could be weakened, or viewed as non-sovereign, as John D. Caputo has been insisting for years, following Derrida? In The Weakness of God, Caputo articulates a thinking of divinity without sovereignty. Here God names the unconditional solicitation of an event rather than a being who is there, an entity trapped in being, even a super-being up there, up above the world, who physically powers and causes it, who made it and occasionally intervenes upon its day-to-day activities to tweak things for the better in response to a steady stream of solicitations from down below. 46 In his later book The Insistence of God, Caputo argues for a theology of "perhaps" that is tied to a weak non-sovereign force rather than traditional sovereign power. As he explains, "the 'perhaps' of which I speak here does not belong to the 'strong' or sovereign order of presence, power, princi ple, essence, actuality, knowledge, or belief." 47 Perhaps means a way to say yes to the future while affirming the "chance of the event," the chance that the event might not happen as well as the chance that the event might not be what we want, or even good; it might be the worst. I will return to Caputo's interpretation of Derrida and the development of his own form of radical theology later in chapter 6.
According to Derrida, as he argues in Rogues, sovereignty is a circular movement; he says that it forms a kind of merry-go-round, a rotary motion that draws power in toward itself and then distributes this same power that it has appropriated for itself back out to the rest of us who are nonsovereign. Now, today, much of this sovereignty has become invisible; we exist in what Deleuze calls a society of control where most of the time we consist of relay points for the distribution and re distribution of sovereignty. The focal point or center of sovereignty is invisible, it appears not to exist, but it functions all-the-more smoothly despite this inexistence. The center of sovereignty is everywhere and nowhere, and its operation seems ubiquitous and invisible, like the spirit of God. How do we track down the machinations of sovereignty so that we can understand and perhaps even disable it, render it inoperable?
Is what Derrida calls the unconditional or the messianic a new form of sovereignty, precisely because it is undeconstructable? It is a pure force and it keeps us awaiting, expecting the unexpected and the unbelievable, like the end of the nation-state or the collapse of global capitalism. Is our faith in God or in democracy precisely what keeps us from resisting or is it what gives us the power to fight back, or is it instead what gives us the strength to resist actually the onslaught of actually existing corporate capitalism? These questions are literally undecidable but nevertheless imperative to think and to think through.
Po liti cal theology reemerges as a discourse when modern liberalism enters into a state of crisis, as foreshadowed by Schmitt. Con temporary po litical theology in the philosophy of Derrida and Giorgio Agamben attends to the fundamental crisis of sovereignty of the modern nation-state. Nations see their sovereignty superceded by flows of money, debt, and energy. In postcolonial terms, the challenge has been to track the emergence of "a global order of empire without colonies," as Partha Chatterjee puts it. 48 In his book The Black Hole of Empire, Chatterjee adopts Schmitt's basic theory of sovereignty and applies it to imperial power. He says that "the imperial prerogative as the power to declare the exception is useful" for making sense of the con temporary world order, not only in economic terms but also as a pedagogical proj ect. 49 In a similar vein, Achille Mbembe recounts the policies during the 1980s and 1990s that have alienated the po liti cal sovereignty of African states and "created the conditions for a privatization of this sovereignty." 50 The deregulation and primacy of the market in neoliberal capitalism coincides with the proliferation and intensification of "private military, paramilitary, or jurisdictional organ izations." 51 As the economies of the United States and Eu rope have weakened over the past few years, Chatterjee now worries that "the asymmetry between the economic trou bles of the Western powers and their overwhelming military superiority could well open the field for a populist resurgence of imperialism, not unlike what was seen in the late nineteenth century." 52 Furthermore, Thomas Picketty's economic analy sis in Capital in the Twenty-First Century has shown that the concentration of capital in Eu rope in the early twenty-first century is very similar to that of the late nineteenth century. 53 We could call this situation a neo-liberalism that devolves into neo-imperialism, a drastic last resort to shore up the power of Western-style capitalism.
We do not need to endorse Schmitt's conclusions to make use of his concepts, as Derrida has shown. Po liti cal theology is not solely about religion, but it uses the situation of religion in the con temporary world as a way to think about sovereignty. Sovereignty for Schmitt and for Chatterjee means the ability to decide on the exception, but for Derrida, sovereignty deconstructs. For Schmitt, sovereignty is based on a unity, a unified decisionmaking power. Today, sovereignty is divided such that there is no absolute sovereign, even if there exist what appear to be sovereign decisions. Monarchical sovereignty is essentially related to mono the ism, where the one king represents and decides in the place of the One God. For Derrida and other theorists, however, sovereignty is dispersed, divided, or shared such that there is no One Decider. The question is then whether there remains sovereignty. Who decides what matters today-the nation, the bank, the market, the army, the people, the consumer? What about the sovereignty of the planet?
The terminal crisis of capitalism is the ecological limit to growth. Technological developments have allowed us to evade the consequences of over-population and over-exploitation of natu ral resources, but these developments have taken place with and within the context of transformations of energy use. The extraordinary material achievements of human civilization over the last couple of centuries, however unevenly distributed, are based on cheap energy, primarily fossil fuels. Alternative energy sources cannot provide the storage, scale, or EROEI that oil and gas, and to a certain extent coal, provide. In addition, we are reaching real limits to growth in terms of atmospheric absorption capacity, rare earth metals, arable farm land, and fresh water. As Michael T. Klare explains in The Race for What's Left, we face an extraordinary combination of factors:
A lack of any unexplored resource reserves beyond those now being eyed for development; the sudden emergence of rapacious new consumers; technical and environmental limitations on the exploitation of new deposits; and the devastating efects of climate change. In many cases, the commodities procured during this new round of extraction will represent the final supplies of their type. 54 (Klare, 18) Capitalism requires growth, and since the 1970s, growth has slowed and resources have become more expensive. The transition to neo-liberalism and the increasing concentration of wealth is what happens when you cannot grow in absolute terms, but only in relative terms.
We need to think about capitalism and neoliberalism, religion and politics in an ecological context. We need to attend to the complex material flows of energy, power, food, climate, money, and blood, as seen in Gil Anidjar's book Blood, considered in the previous chapter. Derrida's philosophy matters in these contexts, even if his work has been canalized into more textual discourses. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida reflects on the location of the human between the animal and the divine, and he attends to the limits of humanity insofar as humanity is implicated in animality and divinity. In modern liberalism, the normal human being exists under the sway of the law, but "sovereign and beast seem to have in common their being-outside-the-law." 55 Who makes an au then tic decision today? God, the autonomous self, the anonymous media, the nation, the market, the brain, or the earth? And what criteria can be applied to determine whether this decision is for the best, or at least for the better? Derrida's faith is that there are not only multiple decisions but always more than just one decider, and that this irreducible plurality at the heart of decision prevents the worst concentration of power in the hands of the One. It's the only hope for democracy, if there is such a thing.
What about the sovereignty of death? At the end of Volume II of The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida returns to his decisive confrontation with Heidegger, armed with a phrase from a poem by Paul Celan and a sustained engagement with the novel Robinson Crusoe. The last line of Celan's poem "Vast, Glowing Vault" is: "the world is gone, I must carry you." Derrida reads this line and this poem carefully in his essay "Rams," and I will discuss this in the following chapter. Here I want to note how Derrida relates the carry ing or the bearing-the German word is tragen-to a kind of sovereignty in Heidegger.
Derrida says that it is not clear whether the word tragen refers more to an experience of mourning the dead person, "or toward the child to be born and still carried by its mother or even toward the poem and the poet himself." 56 Derrida tends to associate the notion of the world as gone (fort in German) with death. Death is the end of the world, and here the world itself is gone, but even in the fort of the world, ich muss dich tragen, I must bear or carry you. This thinking of tragen is related to a thinking of sovereignty in Heidegger's philosophy. Sovereignty in German is Souveränität, but Derrida focuses on Heidegger's word Walten, a word that means rule, reign, or governing. Derrida follows Heidegger in bringing together tragen and Walten around the experience of death.
Sovereignty has to do with the ontological diference, the diference between Being and beings. Being and beings are related in an Austrag, or conciliation, that attests to the sovereign force of diference. 57 At the end of the seminar, Derrida asserts that Walten as ruling power refers to "the event, the origin, the power, the force, the source, the movement, the process, the meaning, etc.-whatever you like-of the ontological diference." 58 The relationship between Being and beings constitutes a world, but this world is decomposed in death. Heidegger says that animals cannot die in an au then tic manner; only Dasein can do so. Derrida questions this assumption, as he deconstructs the opposition between beast and sovereign in his seminar. Derrida claims that "no one in the world will deny, not even Heidegger, then, that both types of living being [beast and sovereign] cease living, find death." 59 One can always find death as a living being, and all living beings exist as cohabitants of a "common habitat, whether one calls it the earth (including sky and sea) or else the world as world of life-death." 60 We presuppose a common world as the envelope of this life-death that we cohabit, but this common world is also in a state of radical dissemination: "perhaps there is no world." 61 Perhaps instead we share an archipelago of islands that are radically un-shareable. " There is no world, there are only islands." 62 The radical un-shareability of worlds means that there is no tenable diference between the beast and the sovereign, even if one makes himself like Robinson Crusoe the master of an island and subdues all the beasts.
In this final seminar, delivered shortly before his death, Derrida argues that despite a certain superficial similarity with Schmitt, Heidegger's understanding of sovereignty is in fact radically dif er ent. Heidegger uses the word Walten as a kind of sovereign force, but his usage indicates an "excess of sovereignty" that undoes "the limits of the theological-political. And the excess of sovereignty would nullify the meaning of sovereignty." 63 Derrida says that for Heidegger Dasein is gripped by, exposed to an originary vio lence. This vio lence is a kind of "efractive departure from self in order violently to break open, to capture, to tame" beings and to treat them as beings, "as sea, as earth, as animal." 64 This vio lence that is proper to the human allows us to discover and make use of beings as such.
The vio lence of Dasein as it is constituted in and by the rift/accord/difference or Austrag between Being and beings gives humanity its sovereignty over the rest of the world. Derrida presses against the limits of this vio lence and the possibility of thinking about the world as a world, and I will come back to this in the next couple chapters. Here, in a striking conclusion Derrida cites Heidegger's argument that " there is only one thing against which all violence-doing, violent action, violent activity, immediately shatters," and "it is death." 65 Death is an absolute limit that shatters the vio lence of human sovereignty, even as it reigns in a hyper-sovereign way.
The question Derrida asks is, how do we know who can die? And this decision on death is a form of sovereignty, even though at the same time it exceeds any form of sovereignty that we know. Here the sovereignty of death exceeds the sovereignty of any sovereign and deconstructs the link between the po liti cal and the theological. This is a genuine "gift of death." Death is the limit of sovereign vio lence, even as it wields its own "sovereign" vio lence over life. Death removes the traditional sovereignty from po liti cal theology, the conjunction of the beast, and the sovereign that animates Western politics and metaphysics. This non-sovereign sovereignty of death delivers us to another scene of po liti cal theology. Our shared death is precisely un-shareable, but it is quintessentially demo cratic.
In the following chapter, I return to Derrida's reading of Celan's poem in connection to Heidegger as he discusses it in "Rams." In "Rams," Derrida reflects on Gadamer's death and Gadamer's hermeneutics, but he ends up as always with a consideration of and confrontation with Heidegger. The ram in the poem and in the biblical tradition, particularly the Aqedah, becomes a figure of death as well as a figure of divinity.
